The suffusion of revolutionary demonstrations in the Arab world which was sparked by Tunisia in December 2010 has been met with emphatic approval by all who hope to see an alternative to the vile and corrupted regimes of the region. These protests have had particular efficacy in decidedly ousting Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt respectively, with a culmination in the bloody demise of Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi. However, the meaning of his death for the future of the Libyan people must be put into perspective by first tracing the turbulent lineage of events to their roots in the earliest Libyan protests. The primary objectives of this article are fourfold: placing the National Transitional Council (NTC) and its pro-privatization leadership’s ideals in context, critically examining the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its neoliberal aims in the conflict by tracing the evolution of Gaddafi’s relationship with the West, expounding the current situation in Libya after Gaddafi’s death, and assessing possible prospects for the future of Libya and the Libyan people.
The unrest in Libya began in February with protests in the city of Benghazi. The protests started as a peaceful demonstration in remembrance of the Abu Salim Prison Massacre of 1996, where over 1200 political prisoners were slaughtered. The outrage found its original foundation in opposition to the regime’s unilateral and clandestine actions against these prisoners, as family members of the prisoners were not informed of the prisoners’ deaths for years. The protest reached its apogee with the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer who represents hundreds of the families of those slain (and who is now a member of the NTC). The reaction against these atrocities was met with violence from authorities, which soon escalated to a general strike against the 42 year old regime of Gaddafi. By early March, when the conflict had further escalated across the country, the NTC had asserted itself as the sole representative of Libya and the Libyan people against the Gaddafi regime. This is a crucial development because of the ideals espoused by its leader Mustafa Abduljalil, which nimbly fall in line with pro-privatization neoliberal business interests.
Neoliberalism can crudely be described as a doctrine which cements private corporate interests driven by profit motives, with aims to eliminate state subsidies such as public healthcare and free education which inconveniently impede profit aspirations. In order for these goals to be met, there is a strong emphasis on economic deregulation, which lends private corporate interests more autonomy as they relentlessly dismantle the welfare state. State subsidies must be completely eviscerated because they are a hindrance to capital accumulation, which is the process that yields profits. However, the pesky bulwark of state subsidies can be circumvented through profit driven privatization. David Harvey has addressed the issue of capital’s need to constantly transcend barriers to capital accumulation (such as state subsidies) in order to survive and expand, and the case of Libya is no different. The profit motives of private corporations are entirely antagonistic to state subsidization of industries, which is why private corporations are so adamant about eliminating them.
Abduljalil’s commitment to this doctrine is corroborated by a Wikileaks cable dated January 27, 2010: “Libya's Justice Minister-equivalent, Mustafa Mohammad Abduljalil, told the Ambassador on January 25 that as Libya opens its economy to other countries, it needs international assistance in developing its private sector and strengthening the commercial legal environment”.1 Open economies are instrumental to neoliberal doctrine because they allow multinational corporations to conduct business in the private sector worldwide. Abduljalil undeniably recognizes this fact and clearly stated his approval of developing the private sector to the US Ambassador in Libya long before there were any stirrings of revolution in the region. The revolution in Libya started with a small localized grievance but as it proliferated across the country and metamorphosed into a generalized disdain for Gaddafi and his regime, it is important to examine NATO’s investment in the NTC’s victory. This victory had to be safeguarded at all costs, which led NATO to co-opt the revolutionary fervor for their own ends under the most spurious auspices imaginable. However, in order to properly unearth NATO’s motivations for intervention, it is first necessary to understand the trajectory of Gaddafi’s relations with the West.
Gaddafi and the West
Gaddafi’s previously hostile relations with the West steadily began to improve after December 2003, when he agreed to eschew all nuclear weapon aspirations. The World Bank provides statistical evidence of this improvement, as they display foreign direct investment inflows in Libya surging from $143 million in 20032 to over $3.8 billion in 20103. After taking this vital first step, Gaddafi began to zealously encourage private business interests in Libya years before Abduljalil, the NTC, or any vestiges of protests complicated the equation. Sizeable portions of this exuberant growth in foreign direct investment from 2003 on can be accounted for with deals well over the hundred million dollar mark with Shell and British Petroleum among others. Libya had managed to wriggle itself out of the mire of “pariah states” by eliminating its nuclear plan and becoming much more amiable to neoliberal business interests (all while still having a ruthless dictator. This is a pattern that apparently can be safely ignored as long as that dictator is staunch in their approval of this doctrine).
However, despite these seemingly positive developments for Libya’s relationship with the West, it was strained throughout the course of its entire development not because of the regime’s refusal to democratize, but because of its policies and actions which were often hostile to business interests. For example, according to various Wikileaks cables, foreign companies were required to hire at least as many Libyans to match the amount of expatriates working for a particular firm. This could be problematic for industries such as oil, where there are very few Libyans who have the technical skills to match the amount of expatriates. As a result, companies were forced to pay for costly training, or to pay for employees who could not contribute to productivity.4 Under strict regulations, expatriate employees were only allowed the inconvenient six month multiple entry visas, which led to the cumbersome process of visa renewal abroad every six months.5 These requirements hurt the profit margins of hopeful multinational corporations and were anything but encouraging for continued business growth in Libya. This sentiment is displayed by a cable which states that “pernicious requirements such as the ‘one expat-one Libyan’ hiring policy and capricious visa policies, do nothing to encourage other U.S. and foreign companies with less international experience to enter the Libyan market”.6 The cable further provides voice to the grievances of unfavorable corporate taxation, labor, and visa policies which resulted in some of the smallest profit margins in the world for oil companies.
These cables clearly depict the intentions of corporations eager to exploit Libya’s vast natural resource reserves, and their impatient exasperation towards the barriers which would have to be overcome if they could hope to improve their profit conditions. As early as July 2006, a cable was sent from the US Embassy in Tripoli which assessed the difficulties of banking privatization in Libya. The private corporation Mckinsey & Company, an international consulting firm, hired an unnamed person to prepare a plan for Libyan bank privatization, and the cable explains that the plan was to “get foreign banks into Libya in the near term, while at the same time formulating a plan for dealing with the state banks and their unwieldy payrolls of public employees”.7 This excerpt further demonstrates the irreconcilable antagonisms between the private sector and state subsidies, and the private sector’s indomitable desire to completely eliminate state subsidies.
Two other major worries among private corporations were the possibility of resource nationalization which would eradicate all prospects of profitability by private corporations, and the penchant for corruption in the regime which had the potential to corrode profits. The first worry is encapsulated by this excerpt from a Gaddafi speech: “‘Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them -- now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money.’ His son, Seif al-Qadhafi, said in March 2007 that, ‘We will not tolerate a foreign company to make a profit at the expense of a Libyan citizen.’”.8 The second worry is captured by the anecdote of Muatassim al-Gaddafi, another of Gaddafi’s sons, placing pressure on Shukri Ghanem, Chairman of National Oil Corporation to provide him with $1.2 billion in cash or oil shipments.9 If the leader’s son had the audacity to coolly demand $1.2 billion from a Libyan citizen, visions of the immense summits that would have to be scaled in order to profitably do business in Libya undoubtedly flashed before the eyes of multinational corporations. Although Gaddafi had demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with neoliberal doctrine’s desires and requirements, there were still myriad inconveniences and barriers for private corporations in the realms of energy, banking, tourism, health services, and others to overcome before Libya could be considered a serious ally of capital accumulation and neoliberal doctrine. Gaddafi’s less pronounced but still existing nationalist tendencies (such as ensuring that all private businesses matched expatriate employee numbers with Libyan employees) were not ultimately suited to business interests, and it was this which decisively sealed his fate once the Libyan people began to voice their own (albeit very different) grievances against him.
NATO’s “Humanitarian” Intervention
Gaddafi’s muffled but still potent nationalist strain was not the sole reason, or even the primary reason NATO intervened to ensure his ousting. The UN very carefully observed the general sentiment in the region as evinced by the “Arab Spring” which was responsible for the successful deposition of other leaders. Although ostensibly strengthening their relationship with Gaddafi’s cooperation since December 2003, the West’s concerns about his commitment to private business interests were still a nagging doubt. This ultimately led to NATO’s intervention against him once they were able to discern the Libyan people’s anger and mobilization against the Gaddafi regime. After this sign of affirmation, the United Nations (UN) speciously passed Security Council Resolution 1973 (less than two weeks after Abduljalil declared his leadership, it should be noted) in order to legitimize intervention under the guise of protecting Libyan civilians. The last enfeebled apologists for intervention walk the boggy ground of “civilian protection”. This justification holds no weight if NATO’s reactions to civilian deaths are critically examined. For example, Human Rights Watch reported the finding of 53 bodies of apparent Gaddafi supporters, all in the same small space of an abandoned hotel, some with bound hands, and all in the same stages of decomposition, suggesting they had been killed at the same time.10 Additionally, in the chaos after Gaddafi’s death, militias were active in terrorizing inhabitants of towns they believed were loyal to Gaddafi. According to another Human Rights Watch Report, Tawergha, which was used as a base by Gaddafi forces until they were forced to flee in August, has been targeted by these militias and “Tawerghans have reported serious abuses, including arbitrary arrests, beatings, and some killings”.11 It would be unfair to completely attribute these and many other grisly anecdotes solely to the NTC or NATO and use it as justification against them. However, if NATO’s concerns were truly about protecting civilians, one would presume that they would place immense pressure on the NTC to expediently conduct investigations to prosecute the perpetrators of these incidents. The fact that there has been no pressure from NATO and no prospects of internal investigation of NTC members who were responsible for “lynching dozens of captured soldiers and suspected foreign ‘mercenaries’”12 after taking control of eastern Libya speaks volumes both about NATO’s supposed intentions of protecting civilians and the legitimacy of the NTC. The NTC’s own inability (or unwillingness) to conduct immediate investigations of these incidents is alarming because it sets a troubling precedent for lawlessness and vigilantism (usually against black Libyans and sub-Saharan African migrants in Libya), as long as the targets are alleged Gaddafi sympathizers. There should be no illusions about NATO’s intervention on the basis of “civilian protection”, and this meretricious justification for intervention should be placed in the broader context of ensuring that their neoliberal ally in the NTC would be the authority waiting in the wings after the chaos subsided.
The justification for intervention would allow NATO to properly exploit the people’s revolution against the regime behind the façade of helping the righteous protestors, while paving the way for their neoliberal cur. The first intervention by NATO began on March 19 and lasted until October 31, when the NTC had secured their position as the recognized Libyan authority. It has since been recognized as the Libyan authority by the US and European Union, with the UN swiftly delivering Libya’s seat to the NTC. Additionally, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have voiced their recognition of the NTC, with the IMF’s recognition “guided by views of its [the NTC’s] membership”.13 The neoliberal virtues extolled by the World Bank and IMF, such as enforcing “structural adjustment programs” which propose economic liberalization in order to qualify for loans, palpably falls in line with Abduljalil’s own economic principles, which sheds light on their ardent support for his new government. I contend that the major authorities of neoliberal doctrine (NATO, the World Bank, and the IMF), would not recognize a new authority in an embattled region so quickly and with such ardor if they were not absolutely sure that the new authority was not in line with their own principles, and if they were not sure that this authority would be more conducive to their interests than its predecessor.
NTC Leadership and the Future of Libya
The death of Gaddafi ensconced the NTC as the sole authority in Libya. However, the zealous neoliberal economic tenets embraced by Abduljalil and his NATO cheerleaders are not the only troubling portent that should be carefully considered. Abduljalil’s xenophobia and reactionary religious rhetoric should also meet our critical gaze. Abduljalil voiced his xenophobia fairly early on in the conflict in April, which is another disturbing attribute of the NTC’s leadership that NATO apparently had no qualms about intervening on behalf of. Abduljalil’s xenophobia is rooted in his distinction between black Libyans (which he apparently does not consider legitimate Libyans and refers to as “Africans”) and Arab Libyans. This is oxymoronic as Libya is an African country, which would render all Libyans as Africans. According to an Amnesty International report, he outrageously and unfoundedly relied on the foulest strain of extreme nationalism as he spouted that Gaddafi was using “‘African mercenaries’ against his own people. He also stated that as the former Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Justice he had witnessed first-hand that “40 per cent of criminals [in Libya] are Africans, passing through, greedily wishing to live in Europe”.14 The report goes on to explain that a majority of captured pro-Gaddafi fighters were actually Libyan nationals, and many dark skinned Libyans were mistaken for foreigners. Abduljalil and his followers have conveniently ignored this fact to date.
Abduljalil’s commitment to reactionary interpretations of religion is also questionable. For example, at a rally celebrating the Libyan revolution on October 23, at this early stage of definite victory Abduljalil presumably believed the matter was so important that he went out of his way to exclaim that the laws passed by Gaddafi which prevented polygamy should be repealed. His justification for this surprising view, especially held by someone so fervently supported by the West, is that it goes against his interpretation of Sharia law, which allows polygamy. He has since reassured the West that Libyan Islam “is moderate”, but it should be recognized that Article 1 of the Libyan interim Constitutional Declaration, passed by the NTC, canonizes Sharia as the primary source of all legislation in Libya with Islam as the state religion. Although this should raise a few eyebrows, it does not necessarily mean that Libya is doomed to endure the harsh implementation of Sharia in countries like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban for two reasons. The first reason is that Sharia law is not a monolithic concept and has historically been interpreted in different ways, and does not by default rule out secular laws. This characteristic malleability of Sharia law, especially under the command of dubious authorities, is very problematic but is an issue which is beyond the scope of this effort. The second reason is that Article 1 also states that the Libyan state is a democracy with guaranteed freedom of religion for non-Muslims. However, it remains to be seen if these aspects of the nascent constitution will be upheld or if they will simply give way to a stringent interpretation of Sharia law and a boisterous nationalistic fervor exemplified by Abduljalil’s solution for refugees, depicted by his promise to “close the borders in front of these Africans”.15 The possibility of a more punctilious interpretation of Sharia law and the implications it will have for the entire Libyan population should seriously be considered as a potentiality given Abduljalil’s own interpretation of it, although this is not to imply that it will unmistakably become a reality.
Although it is too early to definitively assess the outcome in Libya, all signs point to further neoliberalization of Libya’s economy. This can be attributed to NATO’s elimination of the strongest barricade to capital accumulation and Abduljalil’s enthusiastic support for prospects of privatization, which undoubtedly means a curbing of state subsidies and increase of private business prevalence throughout the country. The fact that the issue of business difficulty in Libya because of too much state intervention was a topic of discussion (and much consternation) in cables for many years can help explain why intervention was instrumental for better conditions in the private business environment, and why it is highly probable that state enterprise will give way to widespread privatization. With the assistance of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO successfully managed to co-opt a popular struggle started by the Libyan people against a repressive tyrant for their own profit driven ends under the extremely tenuous justification of protecting the civilian population. If the more outrageous aspects of Abduljalil’s religious fundamentalist aspirations are implemented to their most extreme degree, Libya should have no worries about conflict with the West as long as they frenetically stick to the tenets of private business interests.
A telling example of this pattern is illustrated by the stark contrast between the US’s warmth toward Saudi Arabia, arguably the world’s most repressive regime (but a regime which sticks to ascribed doctrine), and their abject detestation of Iran, a country with a rigidly theocratic regime, but one which does not stick to the ascribed doctrine of bowing to the interests of multinational corporations. An even more pertinent example is the West’s bashful disregard for Gaddafi’s repressive tendencies against the Libyan people once he scrapped his nuclear plans and allowed more private businesses to enter Libya. This pattern of disregard has so far resulted in a failure to put any pressure on the more disgraceful ideals of the new regime’s leader, as Adbuljalil’s xenophobic nationalism has not garnered any serious criticism from any of his Western supporters. This should not come as a surprise given the West’s support for the apartheid state of Israel and other states with deplorable human rights records as long as they stick to ascribed neoliberal doctrine. This demonstrates that cooperation with business interests are a significantly more important criteria for acceptance into the international community than any semblance of democracy or human rights is. The Libyan people have already been forced to endure 42 years of repressive rule. We can only hope that the Libyan left will be able to overcome a new hurdle of mass pro-business privatization and the ominous possibility of nationalistic xenophobia coupled with extreme religious fundamentalism.
Sina Salessi is currently the only leftist getting an MBA at Chapman University in Orange County, California, where he also plays drums in the hardcore punk band Children of God.
Notes
1. “Senior Libyan Justice Official: Less Talk, More Action is Best,” Wikileaks, accessed November 3, 2011.
2.“Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$),” The World Bank, accessed November 7, 2011.
3.“Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$),” The World Bank, accessed November 7, 2011.
4.“Libya Investment Climate Statement,” Wikileaks, accessed November 5, 2011.
5.“Risky Business? American Construction Firm Enters Joint Venture with GOL,” Wikileaks, accessed November 5, 2011.
6.“Libyan Market Tests International Oil and Gas Companies,” Wikileaks, accessed November 6, 2011.
7.“Libyan Prospects for Banking Privatization – Tough Road,” Wikileaks, accessed November 6, 2011.
8.“Growth of Resource Nationalism in Libya,” Wikileaks, accessed November 6, 2011.
9.“National Oil Chairman Shukri Ghanem May Seek to Resign Soon,” Wikileaks, accessed November 6, 2011.
10.“Libya: Apparent Execution of 52 Gaddafi Supporters,” Human Rights Watch, accessed November 7, 2011.
11.“Libya: Militias Terrorizing Residents of ‘Loyalist’ Town,” Human Rights Watch, accessed November 7, 2011.
12.“The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances, and Torture,” Amnesty International, accessed November 7, 2011 (PDF, p. 9).
13.“IMF Recognizes Libya’s National Transitional Council, Says Ready to Support its Efforts to Revive the Country’s Economy” International Monetary Fund, accessed November 3, 2011.
14.“The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances, and Torture,” Amnesty International, accessed November 7, 2011 (PDF, p. 83).
15.“The Battle for Libya” (PDF, p. 89).
